Д. О. Селютин This article addresses the issue of demarcating divine–absolute freedom and human freedom in Spinoza’s philosophy. The study is limited to the material from the «Ethics» and is conducted through a comparison of divine and human intellect. It is argued that in light of the theory of adequate ideas and adequate causes, God’s intellect meets 1) the requirement of substantive adequacy of ideas, 2) the requirement of causal representation of ideas, and 3) the requirement of epistemic activity. For humans, however, since their freedom is understood as rationality and self-determination, these points become impossible, just as their freedom becomes impossible if we maintain the original, non-gradational meaning of the concept of adequacy. In the case that we wish to defend human freedom, at the epistemic level, we would need to lower the bar and use the terminology of adequacy in a weakened, equivocal sense.
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