Th e paper aims to uncover theoretical foundations that enable a constructive analysis of a wide range of concepts of knowledge. Th e key concept is normativity, as defi ned by H. Ginsborg, grounded in the recognition of how we ought to go on, understood in terms of recognizing the uses of expressions as conforming with its past use (by us or by members of a given community). It is suggested that we are currently experiencing another evolutionary stage in the natural historical process of knowledge understanding, associated with a critique of the absolutization of deductive logic as the only permissible inference, which necessitates an emphasis on the diversity of existing practices of knowledge presentation and justifi cation. In addition to the analysis of normativity understood in this way, the idea of «relevance of evidence» is considered as a requirement of beforehand constraining of inquiry in advance, which, if we are talking about knowledge, corresponds to the problem of propositional and doxastic justifi cation, if we are talking about scientifi c knowledge, – to the idea of objectifying nature of inquiry, understood in epistemic terms as following the thesis «a justifi ed belief is, at least, truth-conductive». As a heuristics, several examples of philosophical constructs from the second half of the 20th century are considered, fi rst group consolidates the idea that «logical type of rationality» is limited – E. Gettier, L. Laudan, G. Simon, and as well we consider the naturalized feminist philosophy of science by L. Nelson and one of the moments of the discussion about the scientifi c nature of geology in the 1960s – R. van Bemmelen, R. Watson, with the aim of showing that it is precisely the modern practice of analyzing the accompanying issues of knowledge representation that is capable of prolifi c adding to the thus understood ideas of normativity and relevance of evidence.