А. А. Шевченко The article considers the thesis of epistemic dependence, which problematizes the current ideas about the nature of knowledge, its historical and methodological premises. It shows both undesirable consequences of its uncritical acceptance (such as a possible gap between knowledge and understanding) and the possibility of its interpretation in a more general social context, as a conflict of epistemic interests. It also highlights the need to consider this phenomenon in the analysis of collective knowledge and collective rationality.
Научная статья 
эпистемическая рациональность Дата публикации:
2024-11-23
Серия:
Том (volume):
22
Выпуск (issue):
1
Страницы:
16-26
Идентификатор:
oai:oai.sibphil.elpub.ru:article/659
https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/659
10.25205/2541-7517-2024-22-1-16-26
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