In the framework of phenomenology as a specific eidetic discipline, the problem of the correlation of theoretical and practical aspects requires its solution. The paper focuses on the validity of interpretation of intentionality as a practical intentionality, proposed by Nam-In Lee. Practical intentionality, according to Nam-In Lee, consists only of willing intentions, which can only be realized through practice. I try to subject this interpretation of intentionality to doubt, indicating that intentionality as a cardinal property of consciousness is: 1) a moderator of rational and irrational (sense data); 2) a pre-subjective homogeneous source of all kinds of intentions (both willing and theoretical).
Дата публикации:
2018
Серия:
Том (volume):
16
Выпуск (issue):
1
Страницы:
217-228
Идентификатор:
oai:oai.sibphil.elpub.ru:article/66
https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/66
10.25205/2541-7517-2018-16-1-217-228
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