The article provides a brief analysis of the current debate on the two types of knowledge – knowledge-how and knowledge-that and discusses the possibility of reduction of the former to the latter. Two promising anti-reductionist strategies are highlighted. The first strategy uses the notion of “epistemic luck” to demonstrate that the epistemic characteristics of these two kinds of knowledge differ. The second strategy can be based on M. Dewitt’s treatment of linguistic knowledge, which, if accepted, at least deprives the proponents of epistemic reductionism of claims to the universality of their position.
Дата публикации:
2023-05-12
Серия:
Том (volume):
21
Выпуск (issue):
1
Страницы:
43-50
Идентификатор:
oai:oai.sibphil.elpub.ru:article/556
https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/556
10.25205/2541-7517-2023-21-1-43-50
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Источник: