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D. Dennett’s Real Patterns as a Modal Ontology: Essentialist Interpretation of Truth-Making

Submitted by Гость (not verified) on Thu, 09/05/2024 - 00:08

The paper aims to make a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem within the framework of D. Dennett’s real patterns conception in order to show that D. Dennett’s ontology can be interpreted in a realistic sense not only within the framework of J. Ladyman’s structural realism. As a starting point, the solution of the truth-making problem within the concept of “serious essentialism” by E.J.Lowe is considered. Our thesis is that the expansion of the D. Dennett’s conception with E.J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism” leads us to the conclusion that D.

Unconceived Alternatives and Another Argument for Instrumentalism

Submitted by Гость (not verified) on Thu, 09/05/2024 - 00:08

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Selective skepticism in relation to fundamental scientific theories and criticism of the inference to the best explanation as an eliminative approach to substantiate hypotheses, enable K. Stanford to interpret and combine in his own way the classical arguments against the scientific realism - the arguments of the pessimistic meta-induction and that of the underdetermination of theory by data. Despite the fact that his justification of the instrumentalist interpretation of scientific knowledge is just another version of the argument «from error», K.

From Positivism to Scientific Realism and Social Constructivism: What a Textbook on the Philosophy of Science Should Be. Book Review: Klee R. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Cutting Nature at Its Seams. Oxford University Press, 1997

Submitted by Гость (not verified) on Wed, 09/04/2024 - 23:54

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The emphasis on the fact that the philosophy of science is not always the philosophy of physics, and the use of immunology as the main example makes it possible for Robert Klee to clearly demonstrate that the essence of introduction is not only and not so much to show the development of problems in a historical context, but to point out to the fact that even the most fundamental assumptions and basic intuitions are not immune to criticism.