L. Laudan | Библиотека ELiS

D. Dennett and Scientific Realism: Empirical Equivalence and Evidential Support of Theoretical Statements

Submitted by Гость (not verified) on Wed, 09/04/2024 - 23:54

The paper aims to interpret the reasoning of L Laudan and J. Leplin on the inconsistency of the theses of empirical equivalence and underdetermination of the theory by data within D. Ross’s rainforest realism and D. Dennett’s real patterns concepts. Following L. Laudan and J. Leplin, the main problem is with the absolutization of the idea that the only significant form of evidential support of a theory is the empirical confirmation of its consequences (consequentialism). We believe that the conception “to save the phenomena” (P.

D. DENNETT AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM: AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT AND THE EXISTENCE DIMENSION WITH PROJECTABILITY

Submitted by Гость (not verified) on Wed, 09/04/2024 - 23:54

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The paper aims to look for the arguments against the tenet that the inference to the best explanation that connects the scientific realism and the success of scientific knowledge, and that is coined as the Main argument for the scientific realism, is circular for it contains the affirming the consequent fallacy (L. Laudan, B. Van Fraassen, etc.) A special case of the «Main argument» is considered - the inference to the existence of unobservables on the basis of the causal explanation of the phenomenon.