Contextual moral realism

И. Е. Прись

Submitted by Гость (not verified) on Thu, 10/10/2024 - 16:38

Сибирский философский журнал. 4 / 2024

We argue that genuine moral philosophy is realist, and genuine realism is a contextual realism. Thus, we introduce the position of a contextual moral realism. This is our interpretation of J. Benoist’s moral realism in terms of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The structure of the contextual realism is the structure of the gap between the ideal (rule, norm, concept) and the real. It is also the structure of Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem. Accordingly, the structure of the contextual moral realism is the structure of the application of a moral norm to reality. Norms, including moral norms, are defined and applied in context. The application of a moral norm implies moral sensitivity to a context that is not external to the norm. The contextual moral realism is a critique of moral objectivism, which ignores moral ontology, as well as metaphysical moral realism (Platonism) and naturalistic moral reductionism, which ignore the contextual (genuinely normative) dimension of morality. We also establish similarities between T. Williamson’s moral realism and Benoist’s moral realism, despite the difference in their approaches: for Benoist, philosophy is conceptual analysis, while Williamson sees no principal difference between science and philosophy. In particular, Williamson’s argument against moral inferentialism corresponds to Benoist’s argument against M. Gabriel’s “new moral realism”, and his argument in favour of moral knowledge by sensory perception and by testimony corresponds to contextual argument appealing to moral sensibility.

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