The paper aims to examine the compatibility problem between externalism about mental content and self-knowledge. First, I explore the main anti-compatibilist arguments and objections to them and conclude that anti-compatibilist views imply the shift from the ontological issue to the epistemic one. Second, I argue that compatibilists, in its turn, regardthis shift as unjustified. The reason for that is that they do not accept the Cartesian introspective model of self-knowledge.
Дата публикации:
2020
Серия:
Том (volume):
18
Выпуск (issue):
2
Страницы:
168-180
Идентификатор:
oai:oai.sibphil.elpub.ru:article/360
https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/360
10.25205/2541-7517-2020-18-2-168-180
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